ARCHIVED - Approval of Proposed Corrective Action Plan for Enbridge Pipelines Inc. and its Board-Regulated Subsidiaries – 2015 National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations Audits

The Board notes that Enbridge has not included a specific commitment to ensure that its CAP also includes establishment and implementation of a process for monitoring compliance as required by OPR 6.5(1) (g).

The Board directs that Enbridge establish and implement this process as part of its CAP.

The Board has assessed Enbridge’s proposed CAP and has not identified any significant concerns with the approach or schedule. The Board, however, notes that Enbridge’s commitment is limited to developing a process “to link significant processes together to ensure operational activities of employees and contractors are coordinated and controlled”. The Board is concerned that the processes contemplated to be linked within the proposed CAP include processes identified as deficient. The Board’s audit reports identified that Enbridge’s processes did not meet the requirements of OPR section 6.5 (1) (k) and (q). The Board is of the opinion that linking the previously identified deficient processes will not result in a compliant process as proposed. While Enbridge may be considering the establishment of compliant processes within its overall CAP, the Board did not identify specific commitments to do so.

The Board, therefore, directs Enbridge to ensure that, as part of its CAP, it establishes and implements processes in accordance with OPR paragraphs 6.5 (1)(k) and (q).

The Board has considered Enbridge’s proposed CAP and has identified no concerns with the approach or schedule with the exception of the milestone commitment “Implementation of the Workforce Competency and Qualification Process to align with existing stakeholders processes with safety critical positions”. In its CAP, Enbridge limits wording to “safety critical” activities. The Board is of the opinion that environmental protection activities should also be included.

Enbridge is therefore directed to add “environmental protection” critical tasks wherever safety critical is mentioned within this CAP item and implement the necessitated changes as per the proposed schedule.

The Board is also concerned that Enbridge may be limiting its interpretation of “safety critical” to occupational health and safety considerations. The Board reminds Enbridge that it considers safety of the public within the definition of safety in its requirements.

Enbridge is therefore directed to ensure that its CAP accounts for this safety definition.

The Board finds that this CAP is inadequate as proposed.

Enbridge has committed to developing “a management system level internal and external communication process that aligns with existing internal and external communication processes.” The Board notes that its final audit reports indicated that in addition to Enbridge’s corporate processes being inadequate the practices being utilized within the programs were not all identified to be adequate to meet the Board’s requirements or implemented as required by Enbridge’s existing processes and practices. Therefore, the Board is of the opinion that the CAP as proposed, cannot result in compliant communication processes being established and implemented as they align with deficient processes. Enbridge is directed to re-develop its CAP for this sub-element to ensure that its processes meet the Board’s management system and program requirements as identified in the Final Audit Reports and submit it for approval by 29 May 2016.

The Board approves this CAP with respect to development of its Quality Assurance (QA) Program; however, the Board reminds Enbridge that, to be compliant, the CAP developed should not be limited to a re-development and re-organization of existing activities but must also include consideration of standard QA principles and program requirements such as, for example, management and leadership responsibilities and activities, QA objectives, targets and performance measures and QA activities outside of normal technical program checks.

With respect to Enbridge’s CAP commitment regarding Corrective and Preventive Action processes, the Board notes that Enbridge has limited its references to the Emergency Management and Environmental Protection Programs Final Audit Reports when it is also identified as a deficiency in the Integrity Management and Safety Management Programs Final Audit Reports.

Enbridge is directed to ensure that its CAP for this sub-element also mitigates those program findings as well.

The Board approves Enbridge’s CAP but notes that, in its CAP, Enbridge states that “the regulations do not explicitly require an Emergency Management Policy”.

The Board notes that the OPR 6.3(1) specifically requires that companies shall establish documented policies and goals for meeting its obligations under section 6. The Board notes that section 6 obligations specifically include the safety and security of the public and the company’s employees and the protection of the environment and property throughout the asset lifecycle which would logically include addressing incidents or emergencies. Further, the OPRs indicate that the company must base its management system and programs referred to in OPR section 55 (Emergency Management programs are specifically referred to under section 55 (a)) on the policies established under section 6.3. Additionally the OPRs indicate that management systems must be “explicit” in their design and documentation. Based on these requirements, the Board has determined that Enbridge must have explicit EM programs policies and goals to be compliant and ensure that they meet their safety and environmental protection obligations.

The Board approves the CAP but notes that Enbridge’s CAP, as documented, does not clearly and specifically account for the deficiencies identified in the EM Program Final Audit Report with respect to this sub-element to assure the Board that the identified deficiencies will be addressed.

The EM Program Final Audit Report identified that Enbridge “must demonstrate a documented process that specifically includes direct links between its hazards and evaluations of risk to the determination of the types, approach and development of these controls”.

Enbridge is directed to ensure that its CAP explicitly addresses these requirements.

The Board notes that Enbridge has committed to developing and documenting “an annual process that evaluates human resource needs required to respond in an emergency and as part of emergency planning. This process will ensure that Enbridge can demonstrate its human resources are sufficient for a hypothetical high consequence scenario.”

The Board notes that Enbridge’s proposed CAP is limited to identifying human resource needs and availability based on one scenario per region based on a risk based methodology.

The Board notes that its Final Audit Report identified that any company must be able to demonstrate “the sufficiency of its human resources to meet its obligations to ensure the safety of the public, its employees and the pipeline; and ensure the protection of property and the environment in a documented manner” during an incident. It is the Board’s opinion that Enbridge’s proposed CAP may not address the Board’s finding as it limits itself to one scenario versus a fulsome review of the potential human resource requirements from the perspective of both numbers and skill sets based on a plausible range of scenarios.

The Board finds that this CAP is inadequate as proposed.

The Board directs Enbridge to submit a CAP for approval that addresses the Board’s Non-Compliant findings by 29 May 2016.

The Board approves the CAP but reminds Enbridge that any process developed and implemented needs to ensure that third-parties are communicated with appropriately with respect to legal requirements as identified in the report.

The Board approves Enbridge’s CAP but states that, “the regulations do not explicitly require an Integrity Management Policy”

The Board notes that the OPR 6.3(1) specifically requires that companies must establish documented policies and goals for meeting its obligations under section 6. The Board notes that section 6 obligations specifically include the safety and security of the public and the pipeline throughout the asset lifecycle which would, in the Board’s view, include addressing incidents or emergencies. Further, the OPR’s indicate that the company must base its management system and programs referred to in OPR section 55 (Emergency Management programs are specifically referred to under section 55 (b)) on the policies established under section 6.3. Additionally the OPRs indicate that compliant management systems must be explicit in their design and documentation. Based on these requirements, the Board has determined that Enbridge and other companies must have explicit IM programs policies and goals to be compliant and ensure that they meet their safety obligations.

The Board finds that this CAP is inadequate as proposed.

The Board notes that CSA Z662, 2015 version, has now been released. This version indicates that a company must develop and implement a program to monitor (i.e. test) the H₂S in its crude because it constitutes a potential hazard to the pipeline. CSA Z662-15, Clause 16.1.2 defines the levels of H₂S that are considered to be “sour service”. Clause 16.2.1 (a) (ii) defines this as less than 425 ppm dissolved H₂S as determined by the ASTM UOP163 test method. Therefore, the 2015 version is specific as to the concentration of H₂S as well as specific as to the test method.

The Board directs Enbridge to submit a CAP for approval that addresses the Board’s Non-Compliant finding and the requirements of CSA Z662-15 by 29 May 2016.